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second-price, when there is a single object 
for sale and bidders have private values. We 
show that under certain conditions all four 
auctions yield the same expected revenue 
to  the  seller,  but  once  these  assumptions 
are  relaxed  revenue  equivalence  does 
not hold. We will also study auctions by 
using standard tools from demand theory. 
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expected revenue. 
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OPTIMAL AUCTION MECHANISMS 
WITH PRIVATE VALUES
CommuniCations1. INTRODUCTION 
We are familiar with auctions that are used to sell antiquities or valuable objects. 
They are also used to sell rights to use natural resources, such as spectrum rights 
used  in  telecommunications.  In  the  former  communist  countries,  entire 
enterprises  previously  owned  by  the  state  are  sold  in  auctions.  Government 
contracts, as well as governments' short-term debt are also sold by means of 
auction. The Greek historian Herodotus gives the first known description of 
auctions when he describes the sale of women in ancient Babylon. The design of 
auctions might seem a trivial task, but it is a very serious and interesting field of 
economic analysis.  
Viliam  Vickrey  (1961)  was  the  first  person  to  study  auctions  from  the 
theoretical point of view, and he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 
1996 for his research in this area. Since his pioneering work, the field has grown 
substantially and in 2007 another Nobel Prize was awarded to Leonid Hurwitz, 
Roger Myerson and Eric Maskin for their study of mechanism design, a field 
closely related to auctions. Roughly speaking, a mechanism is a set of rules that 
govern interactions between economic agents. The aim of mechanism design is 
to create a set of rules such that informed agents find it optimal to truthfully 
reveal their private information. The mechanism that possesses such a property 
is called incentive compatible mechanism.  
In the auction theory each bidder assigns a value to the object being auctioned, 
and his value is his private information. The value is distributed according to a 
probability distribution. This value could be regarded as a bidder's reserve price 
or the maximal amount he is willing to pay for the item. Each bidder determines 
a bid at the auction that depends on his value. Some auction forms have the 
property that bidders truthfully reveal their private information, i.e. they bid 
their  true  value.  Auctions  that  possess  this  property  could  be  considered  as 
incentive compatible mechanisms, and in that vein auctions could be regarded 
as a special case of mechanism design.  
There are two possible approaches to auction theory. As we briefly described, 
the  first  approach  employs  mechanism  design  to  analyse  auctions.  This 
approach was used by Milgrom (2004) in his book. The other possible approach 
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as a special case of mechanism design.  
There are two possible approaches to auction theory. As we briefly described, 
the  first  approach  employs  mechanism  design  to  analyse  auctions.  This 
approach was used by Milgrom (2004) in his book. The other possible approach 
is  to  analyse  auctions  as  games  of  incomplete  information  and  to  employ 
Harshanyi's concept of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. This approach dominates in 
Krishna's (2002) book. Menezes and Monteiro (2004) predominantly use the 
game-theoretic  approach,  although  they  give  substantial  attention  to  the 
mechanism  design  approach.  In  this  paper  we  will  use  the  game-theoretic 
approach, which in our opinion is more intuitive.  
Auctions are important not only from the theoretical point of view but also 
from  the  practical  point  of  view.  This  field  sheds  light  on  the  intimate 
relationship between economic theory and practice, because in this field theory 
is  used  to  make  practical  improvements  while  theoretical  findings  are 
confronted  with  real  data  in  order  to  test  their  validity.  One  of  the  leading 
theorists  and  practitioners  in  auction  design,  Paul  Klemperer,  has  written  a 
book (2004) that explains the relationship between auction theory and practice. 
In his book he talks about the auction designed to sell spectrum rights in the UK, 
in  whose  design  he  participated.  A  theory  is  meaningless  without  empirical 
testing. A theory can be logically coherent, but can fail when confronted with 
data. The development of auction theory is accompanied by the development of 
empirical research of auctions. Paarsch and Hang Hong (2006) give a survey of 
empirical models used to test auction data.  
In this paper we will talk about the four most commonly used auctions. The first 
two are known as open auctions because bidders publicly submit their bids. The 
most  commonly  used  auction  form  is  the  English  auction,  in  which  the 
auctioneer starts the auction with a low price and raises that price gradually 
until only one bidder expresses a willingness to buy at that price. The last bidder 
is the winner and he gets the object and pays the price at which the previous 
bidder  dropped  out.  There  exists  another  type  of  English  auction,  which  is 
known  as  Japanese  auction  in  which  the  price  is  raised  continuously  on  an 
electronic display and a bidder presses a button to indicate that he is still active. 
Once the bidder releases the button he drops out from the auction. The last 
bidder who stays in wins the auction and pays the price at which the previous 
bidder dropped out. The other form of open auction is a Dutch auction, which is 
used in Netherlands to sell flowers. The auctioneer starts the auction with a high 
price  and  he  lowers  that  price  gradually.  The  first  bidder  who  indicates  the 
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73interest to buy the item at the price posted by the auctioneer wins the auction 
and he pays that price.  
The other two auction forms are known as sealed-bid auctions, because bidders 
submit  their  bids  in  sealed  envelopes.  In  a  first-price  sealed-bid  auction,  the 
bidder who has submitted the highest bid is the winner and he pays his bid. In a 
second-price auction, the bidder who has submitted the highest bid is the winner, 
but he pays the second highest bid. This auction has the property that each 
bidder  finds  it  optimal  to  submit  a  bid  that  is  equal  to  his  value.  In  the 
terminology of the mechanism design, a second-price auction is an incentive 
compatible  mechanism.  This  property  of  the  second-price  auction  was  first 
noted by Vickrey
1 (1961) and a similar mechanism is now applied in other areas 
of  economics,  and  this  mechanism  is  known  as  the  Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 
mechanism, which is widely used in the analysis of public goods.  
Bidders can have private values for the object, i.e. a value that a particular bidder 
assigns to the object is independent of the values of other bidders. Technically, 
values are independent and distributed according to probability distribution. If 
a bidder intends to keep the object for himself, a private value environment is a 
good description of reality. On the other hand, if bidders compete for a right to 
exploit mineral resources, such as oil, they might have different estimates of the 
amount of oil in the soil. That estimate is called a signal. Different bidders have 
different estimates (signals) that are, roughly speaking, correlated, and a value 
that  a  particular  bidder  assigns  to  the  object  depends  on  the  other  bidders' 
signals.  In  this  case  bidders  values  are  interdependent.  A  special  case  of 
interdependent values is called the common value model in which bidders have 
the same value for the object, but have only noisy signals about that value. For 
example, if a bidder buys the item and plans to resell it in the future, then 
private values are not a good approximation. In that case a bidder might only 
have some estimate of the price at which he can resell the object. Common value 
is a resale price that is the same for all bidders, but is unknown at the time of 
auction. In this paper we will confine our attention only to the private value case.  
                                                 
1  A second-price auction is not equivalent to a Vickrey auction. A Vickrey auction is used in a 
multiple objects auction which will not be analysed in this paper.  
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1  A second-price auction is not equivalent to a Vickrey auction. A Vickrey auction is used in a 
multiple objects auction which will not be analysed in this paper.  
Another  classification  is  possible,  since  there  exists  a  difference  between 
auctions in which there is only a single indivisible object for sale and auctions in 
which multiple objects are sold simultaneously or sequentially. The first type of 
auction is known as a single-object auction and the second type as a multiple-
object auction. We will study only single object auctions.  
Finally, there are two ultimate criteria that an auction mechanism has to achieve. 
The first is efficiency, which means that the object has to be sold to the bidder 
with the highest value. The other aim is maximization of the seller's expected 
revenue from the sale. Sometimes these two criteria are aligned, but sometimes 
they are in conflict and an auction designer faces a trade-off. One might wonder 
why we should be concerned with efficiency. If the object is awarded to a bidder 
who does not have the highest value it might be resold after the auction to a 
person  who  values  it  the  most.  Unfortunately,  it  can  be  shown  that  due  to 
transaction costs and bargaining under incomplete information, the resale stage 
will not result in efficient allocation. When values are private and bidders are 
symmetric (their values are drawn from the same probability distribution), all 
four auctions allocate efficiently. In the private values environment, the problem 
with efficiency might arise in first-price and Dutch auctions when bidders are 
asymmetric.  
As  we  have  announced,  in  this  paper  we  will  be  dealing  with  private  value 
single-object auctions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper in our 
country that deals with the theoretical aspects of auction design. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. In the second part, we derive equilibrium bidding 
strategies in a first-price auction, and we will see that each bidder bids lower 
than his value. In third part, we prove that in a second-price auction there exists 
equilibrium in the dominant strategies in which bidders bid their values. In the 
fourth part, we prove that under certain assumptions all four auctions yield the 
same expected revenue to the seller. The fifth part deals with the optimal reserve 
price that the seller determines to maximize his revenue. In the sixth part, we 
will  see  that  auctions  can  be  studied  by  using  standard  tools  from  demand 
theory, such as marginal revenue. In the seventh part, we will see that revenue 
equivalence  does  not  hold  if  one  of  the  assumptions  underlying  revenue 
equivalence is relaxed. The eighth part is dedicated to bidding rings, or collusion 
in auctions, when bidders act cooperatively. Finally, the conclusion follows.  
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752. FIRST-PRICE AUCTION 
Let us assume that each bidder assigns a value V i  (a random variable) to the 
object  that  is  sold  at  the  auction,  and  that  these  values  are  identically  and 
independently distributed at the interval  ] , 0 [ ω ∈ V i , with the density function 
) (⋅ f  and  the  distribution  function  ) (⋅ F .  The  density  function  is  obtained  by 
taking the derivative of the distribution function. V i  can be interpreted as a 
bidder's reserve price, a maximal price that he is willing to pay for the object. 
Bidder i knows the realization  of his  value vi  of V i , but does not know the 
values of other bidders. He only knows that the values of other bidders are 
distributed  according  to  ) (⋅ F .  Finally,  all  bidders  are  risk  neutral,  i.e.  they 
maximize expected profits.  
The strategy of each bidder is to determine his bid for each possible value. In 
other words, a bidder’s strategy is his bidding function, which is a mapping 
from the set of values to the set of bids:  R bi + → ] , 0 [ : ω . We will assume that this 
function is strictly increasing, but in some papers it is assumed that this function 
is only non-decreasing.  
The rules of the first-price auction are as follows. Each bidder submits to the 
auctioneer a sealed bid that depends on his evaluation. The bidder who has 
submitted the highest bid obtains the object and pays his bid. We will show that 
in a first-price auction each bidder has an incentive to shade his bid, i.e. to bid 
less  than  his  value.  Therefore,  a  first-price  auction  is  not  a  truth-revealing 
mechanism, because bidders do not have an incentive to report their true values.  
We will demonstrate the preceding argument informally, before delving into a 
formal proof. If bidder i wins the item, his payoff is  b v i i i − = Π , otherwise his 
payoff is 0. It is obvious from the profit function that if the bidder submits a bid 
equal to his value his payoff would be 0. Therefore, each bidder will bid less than 
his value in order to obtain a positive profit.  
Now  we  will  derive  equilibrium  bidding  strategies,  by  following  Riley  and 
Samuleson (1981). Suppose there are N bidders. We will first show that each 
bidder  bids  according  to  ) (v b i i  and  that  these  strategies  constitute  a  Nash 
equilibrium. Consider a bidder 1, and suppose that he bids according to  ) ( 1 x b , 
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equilibrium. Consider a bidder 1, and suppose that he bids according to  ) ( 1 x b , 
where  v x 1 ≠ , whereas other bidders bid according to  ) (v b i i . Bidder 1 will win 
the  auction  if  all  other  N-1  values  are  less  than  x.  The  probability  that  a 
particular bidder has a value less than  x is  ) (x F , and therefore bidder 1 wins 
with probability  ) ( ) (
1 x G x F
N ≡
− .  
The expected profit of bidder 1 who has a value v1 and bids as if his value is  x  is: 
) ( ) ( ) , ( 1 1 1 x P x G v x v − ⋅ = Π ,  (1) 
where  ) (x P  is the expected payment bidder 1 has to make to the auctioneer. 
Without loss of generality, we will suppose that the bidder with the value of 0 
has an expected profit of 0,  0 ) 0 , 0 ( 1 = Π , which implies that  0 ) 0 ( = P . On the 
other hand, if bidder 1 follows the strategy  ) ( 1 1 v b , his expected profit is: 
) ( ) ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 v P v G v v v − ⋅ = Π .  (2) 
By differentiating (1) with respect to  x, we have that: 
) ( ) ( 1 ' x G
dx
d
v x P ⋅ = .  (3) 
By integrating the last expression and by using the boundary condition that 
0 ) 0 ( = P , we have that: 
) ( ) (
1
0 1 y dG y v P
v
∫ = .  (4) 
Integrating the last expression by parts, we obtain: 
∫ − =
v dy y G v G v v P
1
0 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( .  (5) 
By using the analogy with (5), we obtain that: 
∫ − =
x
dy y G x xG x P
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( .  (6) 
By using (1), (2), (5) and (6), we have that: 
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x
dy y G x xG x G v dy y G v G v v G v x v v v
v
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) , (
1 , (7) 
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) , (
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 ≥ + ⋅ − = Π − Π ∫
v
x dy y G x G v x x v v v ,  (8) 
regardless of whether  v x 1 ≥  or  v x 1 ≤ . Therefore, we can conclude that bidder 1 
cannot  do  better  than  to  follow  the  strategy  ) ( 1 1 v b ,  because  this  strategy 
maximizes his expected profit.  
By substituting (5) in (2), it becomes clear that bidder 1's expected profit can be 
written  as  ∫ = Π
v
dy y G v v
1
0 1 1 ) ( ) , ( . Thus,  a  bidder's  expected  profit  represents  the 
area below the probability distribution  ) (⋅ G  up to his value (figure 1). From (5) 
we  see  that  the  expected  payment  is  equal  to  the  difference  between  the 
rectangle  area  ) ( 1 1 v G v  and  the  area  below  the  distribution  function  ) (⋅ G  
(expected profit). 
Figure 1: Bidder’s expected payment and profit in a first-price auction 
 
Since  bidder  1’s  expected  payment  is  ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 v b v G v P ⋅ = ,  we  can  obtain  the 
equilibrium strategy in a first-price auction by using (5): 
∫ − = =
v
dy
v G
y G
v
v G
v P
v b
1
0 ) (
) (
) (
) (
) (
1
1
1
1
1 .  (9) 
ω 0
G
Π
P
v1
) ( 1 v G
1
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From the last expression we see that the bidder reduces his bid relative to his 
value (bid shading), as we argued informally. The degree of bid shading depends 
on the number of bidders, and the larger the number of bidders, the lower the bid 
shading, since:  
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
−
) (
) (
) (
) (
1
1
1 v F
y F
v G
y G
N
.   (10) 
At the limit, as  ∞ → N ,  v v b 1 1) ( → , that is, a bidder bids his value. In fact, a 
bidder faces the following trade off. If he reduces his bid relative to his value he 
will pay less if he wins and he obtains a higher profit, but at the same time he 
reduces  the  probability  of  winning  the  auction.  As  the  number  of  bidders 
increases, the second effect dominates and a bidder is more concerned about the 
probability of winning and he lowers the amount of bid shading. 
In  order  to  illustrate  the  preceding  result,  we  will  suppose  that  values  are 
uniformly  distributed.  For  uniform  distribution,  v v F = ) (  and  v v G N 1 ) ( − = .  By 
using these assumptions in (9) we have that: 
v
N
N
N
v
v
v dy y
v
v v b
N
N
N
N
v
⋅
−
= ⋅ − = − =
−
−
− ∫
1 1 1
) (
1 0
1
1 .  (11) 
Therefore,  with  uniformly  distributed  values,  the  bidding  strategy  is  linearly 
increasing the function of value, and as N increases the bid gets closer to the 
value. The bidder's profit is  N v v b v / ) ( = − . 
The expected revenue of the seller in a first-price auction is the expected value 
of the highest bid: 
)] ,..., (max( [ ))] ( ),..., ( [max( 1 1
1 v v b E v b v b E R n n = = .  (12) 
We  have  to  determine  the  distribution  function  of  the  random  variable 
) ,..., max( 1 v v n  in order to calculate this expectation, since the expected value of a 
continuous  random  variable  is  equal  to  a  definite  integral  of  the  random 
variable times its probability density function. This distribution function is the 
probability that  v v v n ≤ ) ,..., max( 1 . Maximal value will be smaller than v if each 
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79of the N values is smaller than v. Since the probability that one value is smaller 
than v is  ) (v F , the probability that all N values are smaller than v is  ) (v F
N  and 
this is the distribution function of the random variable  ) ,..., max( 1 v v n . Thus, the 
seller's expected revenue from a first-price auction is: 
dv v f v F v Nb v F d v b R
N N ∫ ∫
− = =
ω ω
0
1
0
1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( .  (13) 
3. SECOND-PRICE AUCTION 
In a second-price auction each bidder submits a sealed bid to the auctioneer. 
The bidder with the highest bid wins the item, but he pays the second highest 
bid. As we will see below, this auction is a truth-revealing mechanism, since 
each bidder has an incentive to report his value truthfully. In contrast to a first-
price auction, where each bidder pays his bid, in a second-price auction the 
price paid by the winning bidder is determined by the bid of the other bidder.  
In  his  seminal  paper,  Vickrey  (1961)  has  shown  that  a  bidder’s  dominant 
strategy  is  to  bid  his  value.  In  other  words,  a  second-price  auction  has  an 
equilibrium in dominant strategies. In order to demonstrate this argument, we 
will use the following proof.  
Let us assume that bidder 1 has a value v1 and denote his bid by b1. The highest 
bid of other bidders is b ˆ . Suppose that bidder 1 underbids, that is bids lower 
than his value  v b 1 1< . When  b b ˆ
1 > , bidder 1 still wins the object even with this 
lower bid. However, when  v b b 1 1 ˆ < < , he loses the auction he would have won if 
he had reported truthfully. In this case, he earns a profit of 0 instead of the 
positive profit  b v ˆ
1− . Thus, this deviation is not profitable.  
The same argument applies to overbidding. In this case  v b 1 1> . If  b b ˆ
1< , bidder 
1 loses the auction and the outcome is the same as if he had bid his value. 
However, when  v b b 1 1 ˆ > > , bidder 1 wins the auction that he would have lost if 
he had bid his value. In this case, he ends up with negative profit of  0 1 1 < −b v , 
instead of profit of 0. Therefore, this deviation is not profitable.  
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than his value  v b 1 1< . When  b b ˆ
1 > , bidder 1 still wins the object even with this 
lower bid. However, when  v b b 1 1 ˆ < < , he loses the auction he would have won if 
he had reported truthfully. In this case, he earns a profit of 0 instead of the 
positive profit  b v ˆ
1− . Thus, this deviation is not profitable.  
The same argument applies to overbidding. In this case  v b 1 1> . If  b b ˆ
1< , bidder 
1 loses the auction and the outcome is the same as if he had bid his value. 
However, when  v b b 1 1 ˆ > > , bidder 1 wins the auction that he would have lost if 
he had bid his value. In this case, he ends up with negative profit of  0 1 1 < −b v , 
instead of profit of 0. Therefore, this deviation is not profitable.  
Thus, we have shown that in a second-price auction truth-telling is a dominant 
strategy. Since the same argument applies to each bidder, the equilibrium of the 
second-price auction is an equilibrium in dominant strategies.  
Let us now calculate the expected revenue of the seller in a second-price auction. 
The seller’s expected revenue is the expected value of the second highest value, 
which is equal to: 
∫ ∫ = =
ω ω
0 2 0 2
2 ) ( ) ( dy y f y dy y F yd R ,  (14) 
where  )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1
2 y F y F N y F y F
N N − ⋅ + = −  is the distribution function of the 
second highest value ( y v v v of highest nd N < } ,..., , {       2 2 1 ). The first term represents 
the event that all N values are less than y and the second term represents the 
event that N-1 values are less then y and one value is higher than y and there are 
N different ways in which this can happen. This distribution function can be 
written as  ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 1
2 y F N y F N y F
N N ⋅ − − ⋅ = −  and its density is: 
) ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 2
2 y f y F y F N N y f N − ⋅ − = − .  (15) 
By substituting (15) in (14), the expected revenue for the seller in a second-price 
auction becomes: 
dy y f y F y F y N N R
N ∫ − ⋅ − =
− ω
0
2 ) ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 .  (16) 
Vickrey (1961) pointed out that in second-price auctions bidders are not obliged 
to  do  difficult  mental  calculations  to  find  equilibrium  bids  as  in  first-price 
auctions,  and  second-price  auctions  are  strategically  simpler.  This  property 
favours a second-price auction, but as we will see below its major weakness is 
that it is fragile to collusion.  
4. REVENUE EQUIVALENCE 
The  famous  revenue  equivalence  theorem  demonstrates  that  if  values  are 
independent  and  bidders  are  risk  neutral  and  symmetric,  the  two  auction 
mechanisms yield the same expected revenue to the seller,  R R
2 1 =  (the proof of 
Optimal Auction Mechanisms with Private Values
81the  revenue  equivalence  by  using  the  game-theoretic  approach  is  given  in 
appendix A). The result depends crucially on these three assumptions, and if 
one of these is not satisfied, the revenue equivalence no longer holds. But we 
will postpone the discussion about relaxing some of the assumptions.  
As  we  have  proved  in  appendix  A,  a  first-price  auction  and  a  second-price 
auction generate the same expected revenue to the seller, but we can extend this 
result  to  all  four  auction  forms.  First,  note  that  the  English  auction  is 
strategically equivalent to a second-price auction. This is because in the English 
auction  each  bidder  stays  in  until  the  price  determined  by  the  auctioneer 
reaches his value. By further staying in the auction after the price has become 
higher than the value, a bidder can only make a loss if he wins, so his dominant 
strategy is to quit the auction when the price reaches his value. But this is the 
same strategy as in a second-price auction, and these two auction forms are 
strategically  equivalent.  The  payoff  to  the  winning  bidder  is  the  difference 
between his value and the second highest value, since the next-to-last bidder 
dropped out when the price reached his value, the same payoff as in a second-
price auction. The expected revenue of the seller is equal to the expectation of 
the second highest value as in a second-price auction, and thus the expected 
revenue of the seller in these two auction forms is the same.  
Furthermore, a bidder in a Dutch auction will bid less than his value, since he 
pays his bid and his profit is the difference between his value and his bid. Thus, 
a bidder in a Dutch auction faces the same problem as a bidder in a first-price 
auction and these two auction forms are strategically equivalent. The expected 
revenue of the seller in a Dutch auction is equal to the expected value of the 
highest bid, the same as in a first-price auction. 
Therefore, we can conclude that if values are independent and bidders are risk 
neutral  and  symmetric,  first-price,  second-price,  English  and  Dutch  auction 
generate the same expected revenue to the seller. 
It is important to note that this principle holds only in expected terms, and that 
for particular realizations of the two highest values  ) , ( 2 1 v v  one auction  form 
generates higher revenue for the seller. For example, if values are uniformly 
distributed,  then  by  using  the  equilibrium  strategies  derived  above  we  can 
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price auction. The expected revenue of the seller is equal to the expectation of 
the second highest value as in a second-price auction, and thus the expected 
revenue of the seller in these two auction forms is the same.  
Furthermore, a bidder in a Dutch auction will bid less than his value, since he 
pays his bid and his profit is the difference between his value and his bid. Thus, 
a bidder in a Dutch auction faces the same problem as a bidder in a first-price 
auction and these two auction forms are strategically equivalent. The expected 
revenue of the seller in a Dutch auction is equal to the expected value of the 
highest bid, the same as in a first-price auction. 
Therefore, we can conclude that if values are independent and bidders are risk 
neutral  and  symmetric,  first-price,  second-price,  English  and  Dutch  auction 
generate the same expected revenue to the seller. 
It is important to note that this principle holds only in expected terms, and that 
for particular realizations of the two highest values  ) , ( 2 1 v v  one auction  form 
generates higher revenue for the seller. For example, if values are uniformly 
distributed,  then  by  using  the  equilibrium  strategies  derived  above  we  can 
conclude  that  if  v N v N 2 1 ) 1 /( > − ,  then  a  first-price  auction  generates  higher 
revenue than a second-price auction. If the reverse inequality holds, a second-
price auction generates higher revenue than a first-price auction.  
The revenue equivalence can be extended in the following way. In general, it 
states that any two auction forms that have the same allocation rule and that 
give the same expected profit to the bidder with the lowest possible value yield 
the same expected revenue for the seller. This property is useful in deriving 
equilibrium bidding strategies in some unusual auction forms such as all-pay 
auctions in which all bidders pay their bids and the bidder with the highest bid 
wins the object.  
In order to prove this general result we will use the mechanism design approach. 
Denote bidder i's expected profit as: 
) ( ) ( Pr ) ( v P v v v i i i − ⋅ = Π ,  (17) 
where  ) ( Pr v i  is the probability that bidder i wins the auction and  ) (v Pi  is the 
bidder's expected payment. If bidder i who has a value v behaves as if he has a 
value  ' v , his expected profit would be:  
) ( ) ( Pr ) , ( ' ' ' v P v v v v i i i − ⋅ = Π .  (18) 
A bidder who has a value  ' v  has the expected profit: 
) ( ) ( Pr ) ( ' ' ' ' v P v v v i i i − ⋅ = Π .  (19) 
Subtracting (19) from (18) and, rearranging, we obtain: 
) ( Pr ) ( ) ( ) , ( ' ' ' ' v v v v v v i i i ⋅ − + Π = Π .  (20) 
In equilibrium, a bidder with value v does not have an incentive to deviate: 
) ( Pr ) ( ) ( ) ( ' ' ' v v v v v i i i ⋅ + Π ≥ Π − .  (21) 
The same inequality holds for a bidder with value  ' v : 
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If we consider a continuous case where  dv v v + = ' , we obtain from (21) and (22): 
) ( Pr
) ( ) (
) ( Pr v
dv
v dv v
dv v i
i i
i ≥ Π − + Π ≥ + .  (23) 
In the limiting case when  0 → dv , we obtain that the slope of the profit function 
of bidder i is: 
) ( Pr
) (
v
dv
v d
i
i = Π .  (24) 
Integrating this expression, we have that: 
∫ + Π = Π
v
i i i dy y v 0 ) ( Pr ) 0 ( ) ( .  (25) 
Now consider any two auction mechanisms that give the same payoff to the 
lowest possible type  ) 0 ( Πi  and that have the same allocation rule, i.e. they give 
the same probability of winning  ) ( Pr v i  to every bidder. According to (25), in 
these two mechanisms, the expected profit of a bidder with value v is the same. 
Since  the  expected  profit  of  a  bidder  with  value v is  ) ( ) ( Pr ) ( v P v v v i i i − ⋅ = Π , 
where  ) (v Pi  is his expected payment, it follows that a bidder with value v has 
the  same  expected  payment  in  these  two  mechanisms.  The  seller’s  expected 
revenue is equal to the sum of expected payments of all bidders, and it follows 
that in any two auction mechanisms that give the same expected profit to a bidder 
with the lowest possible value and that have the same allocation rule, the expected 
revenue for the seller is the same. 
In particular, English, Dutch, first-price  and second-price auctions give zero 
expected profit to a bidder with the lowest possible value, and the bidder with 
the highest value always wins the auction if bidders are symmetric. Thus, these 
four auction forms give the same expected revenue to the seller. 
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revenue is equal to the sum of expected payments of all bidders, and it follows 
that in any two auction mechanisms that give the same expected profit to a bidder 
with the lowest possible value and that have the same allocation rule, the expected 
revenue for the seller is the same. 
In particular, English, Dutch, first-price  and second-price auctions give zero 
expected profit to a bidder with the lowest possible value, and the bidder with 
the highest value always wins the auction if bidders are symmetric. Thus, these 
four auction forms give the same expected revenue to the seller. 
5. RESERVE PRICES AND ENTRY FEES 
In some cases it is optimal for the seller to set a reserve price, a price below 
which he is not willing to sell the item. If there is only one bidder and no reserve 
price, he can bid 0 for the item and get it for free. On the other hand, if the seller 
sets too high a reserve price, he runs a risk of not selling the object. Therefore 
the seller must balance off these two effects and find the optimal reserve price 
for  which  the  expected  gain  from  selling  at  a  higher  price  is  equal  to  the 
expected loss if the item is not sold. We will first find the optimal reserve price 
for a seller who is facing a single bidder
2, and then we will generalize the result 
for a multiple bidder case.  
Suppose that the seller attaches a value v0 to the object for his personal use, and 
that  a  single  bidder  has  a  value v.  If  he  sells  the  object  at  the  second-price 
auction at the reserve price r his payoff is  v r 0 − , otherwise his payoff is 0. The 
probability that he will sell the object at the reserve price is  ) ( 1 ) ( r F r v P − = >  
(the probability that a bidder’s value is higher than r when he pays r) and the 
probability of not selling the object is  ) ( ) ( r F r v P = < . Thus, the seller’s expected 
profit is: 
) )]( ( 1 [ ) ( 0 0 v r r F r − − = Π .  (26) 
The first order condition yields: 
0 ) )( ( )] ( 1 [
) (
0
0 = − − − = Π
v r r f r F
dr
r d .  (27) 
By solving this equation we obtain the optimal reserve price: 
) (
) ( 1
0 r f
r F
v r
−
+ = .  (28) 
From the last expression we see that a seller sets a higher reserve price than his 
personal value for the object. This solution is similar to a monopolist who sets a 
higher price than his marginal cost. In the auction context, the seller extracts 
                                                 
2 The proof for a single bidder case is due to Rasmusen (2007). 
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85more surplus if a bidder has a high value and sacrifices a surplus in the case 
where  a  bidder  has  a  low  value.  When  the  value  of  the  bidder  is  such  that 
v v r 0 > > , the seller retains the item, and this is inefficient since the bidder has a 
higher  value.  This  result  is  similar  to  a  deadweight  loss  due  to  a  monopoly. 
Moreover,  the  inefficiency  of  monopoly  stems  from  the  fact  that  monopoly 
produces  less  than  the  competitive  level  and  charges  a  higher  price.  In  the 
auction context, the seller reduces the probability of selling the object (quantity) 
by setting a reserve price that is higher than his value (which can be considered 
as a marginal cost).  
We will now generalize the result for the case of several bidders. Surprisingly, 
the same formula for the optimal reserve price in a second-price auction derived 
above applies, which implies that the optimal reserve price is independent of the 
number of bidders. 
From the preceding results we have that  ∫ =
ω
0 2
2 ) ( dy y f y R  and: 
) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) (
2
2 y g y F N y f y F y F N N y f
N ⋅ − ⋅ = − ⋅ − =
− ,  (29) 
where  ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
2 y f y F N y g
N ⋅ − =
−  is  the  density  of  ) ( ) (
1 y F y G
N− ≡ .  Therefore, 
we have that:  
dy y g y F y N dy y f y R ∫ ∫ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ = =
ω ω
0 0 2
2 ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( .  (30) 
Since  the  expected  revenue  of  the  seller  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  expected 
payments of all N bidders, the ex ante expected payment (expected payment for 
all  possible  realizations  of  values)  of  a  particular  bidder  in  a  second-price 
auction is: 
dy y g y F y P E ∫ ⋅ − ⋅ =
ω
0 ) ( )) ( 1 ( ] [ .  (31) 
But when the seller posts a reserve price, the ex ante expected payment of a 
bidder becomes: 
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Since  the  expected  revenue  of  the  seller  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  expected 
payments of all N bidders, the ex ante expected payment (expected payment for 
all  possible  realizations  of  values)  of  a  particular  bidder  in  a  second-price 
auction is: 
dy y g y F y P E ∫ ⋅ − ⋅ =
ω
0 ) ( )) ( 1 ( ] [ .  (31) 
But when the seller posts a reserve price, the ex ante expected payment of a 
bidder becomes: 
dy y g y F y r G r F r P E
r ∫ ⋅ − ⋅ + − =
ω
) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ] [ ,  (32) 
where the first term represents the expected payment when all bidders have 
values lower than r and a particular bidder has a value higher than r and pays 
the  reserve  price.  This  event  happens  with  probability  ) ( )) ( 1 ( r G r F − .  The 
second term represents the event where the second-highest value is higher than 
r when the winning bidder pays the second-highest value. The seller retains the 
object with probability  ) (y F N  and he attaches a value of v0  to the object. His 
expected payoff is: 
v y F P E N
N
0 0 ) ( ] [ ⋅ + ⋅ = Π .  (33) 
Differentiating this expression with respect to r, and by using Leibnitz’s rule
3 for 
differentiating integrals we obtain: 
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( 1 [ ) ( )] ( 1 [ ) ( )] ( ) ( 1 [ 0
1 0 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ − − ⋅ = Π − v r f r F N r g r F r r g r F r r G r rf r F N
dr
d N   (34a) 
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( 1 [ 0
0 = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ − − ⋅ = Π
v r f r G N r G r rf r F N
dr
d .  (34b) 
0 ) ( )) ( 1 (
) ( 1
) (
) ( 1 0
0 = − ⋅ ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
− − ⋅ = Π r G r F
r F
r f
v r N
dr
d .  (35) 
From the last result we obtain the optimal reserve price: 
) (
) ( 1
0 r f
r F
v r
−
+ = .  (36) 
We have shown that with many bidders the optimal reserve price is the same as 
in  the  case  of  a  single  bidder.  The  reason  underlying  this  result  is  that  the 
reserve price is important only in the case where a highest value is higher than 
                                                 
3  Leibnitz’s rule says that 
∫ ∫ ∂
∂
+
∂
∂
⋅ −
∂
∂
⋅ =
∂
∂ ) ( ) (
) ( ) (
) , ( ) (
) ), ( (
) (
) ), ( ( ) , (
r b r b
r a r a
dx
r
r x f
r
r a
r r a f
r
r b
r r b f dx r x f
r
.  
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87the reserve price and all other values are lower than the reserve price, and this 
explains why the optimal reserve price does not depend on the number of bidders.  
Now suppose that there are two bidders and that the seller has a zero value for 
the object. In finding the optimal reserve price the seller faces the following 
trade off. If the reserve price is too high, it can happen that the highest value is 
lower than the reserve price and the object remains unsold. The probability of 
this event is  ) ( 2 r F , the loss is r, and the expected loss is  ) ( 2 r rF . But in the case 
where the highest value is higher than the reserve price and the second highest is 
lower, the seller's expected gain is r and this event happens with probability 
)) ( 1 ( ) ( 2 r F r F − ⋅ ⋅  (there are two ways in which this can occur). The expected 
gain is  )) ( 1 ( ) ( 2 r F r F r − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ . For small r the expected gain exceeds the expected 
loss and the reserve price increases the expected revenue of the seller. But as r 
rises, at some point the expected loss outweighs the expected gain and it is not 
profitable to increase further the reserve price.  
In  order  to  illustrate  the  trade  off,  suppose  that  the  value  is  uniformly 
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) 1 ( 2 3 2 = ⇒ = − ⋅ ⋅ r r r r .  (37) 
This result shows that it is optimal for a seller to exclude some bidders with 
values lower than the reserve price from the auction and this fact is referred to 
as  the  exclusion  principle.  Bidders  with  lower  values  are  excluded  from  the 
auction,  which  decreases  the  seller's  expected  revenue,  but  bidders  who 
participate bid more aggressively, which increases the seller's expected revenue 
since an active bidder now has to beat other bidders whose values belong to 
interval  ] , [ ω r  instead of  ] , 0 [ ω .  
Bulow and Klemperer (1986) point out that it is more beneficial for a seller to 
have an additional bidder than to post a reserve price in English and second-
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since an active bidder now has to beat other bidders whose values belong to 
interval  ] , [ ω r  instead of  ] , 0 [ ω .  
Bulow and Klemperer (1986) point out that it is more beneficial for a seller to 
have an additional bidder than to post a reserve price in English and second-
price auctions. As in the preceding example, value is uniformly distributed in 
] 1 , 0 [  and  0 0 = v . The optimal reserve price is 1/2, and if there is only one bidder 
the seller will sell one half of the time, resulting in the expected revenue of 1/4. If 
there are two bidders, but the seller cannot post a reserve price, his expected 
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The first term represents the probability that one value is higher than v and that 
the other is lower than v and there are two different ways in which this can 
occur. The second term represents the probability that both values are less than 
v. In the case of uniform distribution where  y y F = ) ( , the distribution function 
becomes  y y y y y y F
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Thus, the expected revenue is higher when there are two bidders and no reserve 
price, than when there is one bidder and the seller posts a reserve price. The 
additional bidder is worth more than the reserve price in English and second-price 
auctions.  
The seller can exclude the same set of bidders by using an entry fee, the amount 
that each bidder has to pay in order to participate in the auction. The same set 
of bidders can be excluded by using an entry fee that is equal to the profit of a 
bidder with value r, which means that only bidders with values higher than r will 
find it worthwhile to pay the entry fee. In order to determine the optimal entry 
fee, note that the expected payment of a bidder in a first-price auction can be 
written as: 
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∫ ⋅ − = =
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( .  (41) 
Since  v v G ) (  is the total expected utility of obtaining the object and  ) (v P  is a 
payment,  it  follows  that  the  expected  profit  is  equal  to 
dy y G v P v v G
v
∫ ⋅ = − = Π
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( . As we have previously shown, a bidder's expected 
profit is equal to the area below the distribution function. By using that result, 
we can conclude that an optimal entry fee that excludes the same set of bidders 
as a reserve price of r is equal to the expected profit of a bidder with value r: 
dy y G e
r
∫ ⋅ =
0 ) ( .  (42) 
6. MARGINAL REVENUE APPROACH 
Bulow and Roberts (1989) have shown that it is possible to study auctions by 
using standard tools from monopoly pricing, such as marginal revenue curves. 
The  probability  that  a  buyer’s  value  is  higher  than  v ,  q v F ≡ − ) ( 1  can  be 
regarded as a quantity, because when a seller posts a price of v he will sell with 
probability  ) ( 1 v F − .  This  demand  curve  gives  the  maximal  price  when  the 
quantity is 0 and minimal price when the quantity is 1 (figure 2). From the 
expression for quantity we can obtain the price: 
) 1 ( 1 q F v − = − .  (43) 
The total revenue is the product of total quantity and the price: 
q q F R ) 1 ( 1 − = − .  (44) 
From the last expression we can obtain marginal revenue: 
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By substituting the expression for  ) 1 ( 1 q F v − = − , we obtain: 
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Figure 2: Probability distribution and marginal revenue 
 
 
Graphically,  the  inverse  demand  function  can  be  obtained  by  rotating  the 
distribution  function.  The  marginal  revenue  curve  lies  below  the  inverse 
demand function. 
Myerson  (1981)  shows  that  in  the  optimal  auction  mechanism,  which 
maximizes the seller’s expected revenue, the seller should sell the object to a 
buyer with the highest virtual valuation defined as: 
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The price paid by the winning buyer would be the lowest possible price that 
would let him win the auction.  
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) prove that the expected revenue of the seller is 
equal  to  the  expected  marginal  revenue  of  the  winning  bidder  by  using  the 
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91marginal revenue approach and justify Myerson’s (1981) result that it is optimal 
to allocate the item to the bidder with the highest marginal revenue. We will 
explain their results by following their paper as well as Klemperer (2004). 
Figure 3a: Expected Revenue as rectangle  Figure 3b: Expected Revenue as area 
                        below MR 
 
From figure 3a we see that the total expected revenue for the seller when the 
price  is v is  equal  to  )) ( 1 ( ) ( v F v v q v − ⋅ = ⋅ .  We  see  from  figure  3b  that  it  is 
possible to calculate the seller’s expected revenue as the area below the marginal 
revenue curve up to the quantity  ) ( 1 v F q − ≡ . Therefore, the last result implies 
that: 
∫ = ⋅
) (
0
)) ( ( ) (
v q
dq q v MR v q v .  (49) 
Suppose that v is the second highest value and this is the price paid by the 
winning bidder in an English or second-price auction. Solving the last equation 
we obtain that the price paid is equal to the expected marginal revenue of the 
bidder conditional on the bidder’s value exceedingv: 
∫ =
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A bidder whose value exceeds v is the winning bidder and the seller’s expected 
revenue  in  an  English  or  a  second-price  auction  is  equal  to  the  expected 
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marginal  revenue  of  the  winning  bidder.  Thus,  we  have  proved,  at  least 
intuitively, why the optimal auction mechanism maximizes the seller’s expected 
revenue  when  the  seller  allocates  the  object  to  the  bidder  with  the  highest 
marginal revenue.  
Myerson’s  virtual  valuation  corresponds  to  the  marginal  revenue  defined  by 
Bulow  and  Roberts  (1989)  and  they  use  the  marginal  revenue  approach  to 
illustrate Myerson’s (1981) abstract result. Bulow and Roberts (1989) define the 
following second marginal revenue auction in which the bidder with the highest 
marginal revenue wins the item and he pays the lowest possible value that would 
still let him win the auction. The seller is supposed to have the marginal revenue 
of zero. In order to illustrate how this auction works, we will consider three 
possible  cases.  If  only  bidder  1  has  positive  marginal  revenue  and  all  other 
bidders have negative marginal revenues, he will win the auction and the price 
he pays  * v  is equal to the value that would make his marginal value equal to 
zero  0 *) ( 1 = v MR , since this is the lowest possible value that would let him win. 
For any value lower than this, his marginal revenue would be negative and he 
would not win the object since the seller has marginal revenue of zero. The 
graphical illustration of this price could be explained with figure 2. The price 
paid by the bidder is denoted  ρ  and this is the lowest possible price he could 
pay. If some other bidder has positive marginal revenue, the price paid will be 
higher. The bidder can conclude that it is worthless participating in the auction 
if his value is lower than  ρ . If more than one bidder has a positive marginal 
revenue, and the second highest marginal revenue is equal to  MR2, the price 
paid by a bidder who wins the auction, bidder 1 say, is the lowest possible value 
* v  that would still let him win the auction, i.e.  MR v MR 2 1 *) ( = . By solving this 
equation we obtain that  ) ( * 2
1
1 MR MR v − =  (figure 2).  
In this auction each bidder reveals truthfully his marginal revenue, since the 
price paid by the winning bidder is independent of his marginal revenue. On the 
other hand, this mechanism is not efficient, since the bidder with the highest 
marginal revenue need not be the bidder with the highest value.  
In order to illustrate the functioning of the second-marginal revenue auction, 
suppose that there are two bidders. Bidder 1 has a value uniformly distributed in 
] 10 , 0 [ 1∈ v , whereas bidder 2 has a value uniformly distributed in  ] 30 , 10 [ 2∈ v . 
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Since  ) ( 1 1 1 v F q − ≡  represents the probability that a bidder’s value exceeds v1, 
for  0 1 = v ,  1 1 = q  and  for  10 1 = v ,  0 1 = q .  By  the  same  fashion,  the  inverse 
demand curve for bidder 2 could be written as  q v 2 2 20 30− = . We know from 
monopoly pricing that marginal revenue has a twice-steeper slope than inverse 
demand function. Thus, for bidder 1 the marginal revenue is  q MR 1 1 20 10− =  
and  for  bidder  2  q MR 2 2 40 30− = .  By  substituting  the  demand  functions 
10 / ) 10 ( 1 1 v q − =  and  20 / ) 30 ( 2 2 v q − = , we obtain the following marginal revenue 
functions: 
10 2
10
10
20 10 1
1
1 − = ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −
⋅ − = v
v
MR ,  (51) 
30 2
20
30
40 30 2
2
2 − = ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −
⋅ − = v
v
MR .  (52) 
We will now analyse three cases. We can conclude that  0 1≥ MR  when  5 1≥ v  and 
0 2 ≥ MR  when  15 2 ≥ v .  Bidder  1  wins  the  object  when  5 1≥ v  and 
10 2 1 2 1 − > ⇔ ≥ v v MR MR  and the price he pays is  ) 10 , 5 max( 2 − v , since he pays 5 
if  0 2 = MR  and the lowest possible price with which he can win if  0 2 ≥ MR  is 
10 2 1 − = v v . If  15 2 ≥ v  and  10 1 2 + > v v , bidder 2 wins and the price he pays is 
) 10 , 15 max( 1+ v . If  5 1< v  and  15 2 < v , the seller retains the object. We will take 
the  following  example.  If  8 1 = v  and  17 2 = v ,  then  4 6 2 1 = ≥ = MR MR .  Thus, 
bidder 1 wins the object even though he has the lower value and the allocation is 
inefficient.  Bidder  1  pays  the  price  such  that  4 *) ( 2 1 = = MR v MR .  Solving  the 
equation  4 10 * 2 = − v , it follows that bidder 1 pays a price equal to 7.  
In the preceding example bidder 1 obtains a profit of 1 since his value is 8 and 
he pays a price of 7. This profit can be referred to as the informational rent since 
the bidder knows his value and the seller must give him a rent to induce him to 
reveal his private information.  
Finally, note that the marginal revenue approach is similar to monopoly pricing, 
because the bidder with a negative marginal revenue does not obtain the object. 
This is similar to a monopolist who never sells a quantity such that his marginal 
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if  0 2 = MR  and the lowest possible price with which he can win if  0 2 ≥ MR  is 
10 2 1 − = v v . If  15 2 ≥ v  and  10 1 2 + > v v , bidder 2 wins and the price he pays is 
) 10 , 15 max( 1+ v . If  5 1< v  and  15 2 < v , the seller retains the object. We will take 
the  following  example.  If  8 1 = v  and  17 2 = v ,  then  4 6 2 1 = ≥ = MR MR .  Thus, 
bidder 1 wins the object even though he has the lower value and the allocation is 
inefficient.  Bidder  1  pays  the  price  such  that  4 *) ( 2 1 = = MR v MR .  Solving  the 
equation  4 10 * 2 = − v , it follows that bidder 1 pays a price equal to 7.  
In the preceding example bidder 1 obtains a profit of 1 since his value is 8 and 
he pays a price of 7. This profit can be referred to as the informational rent since 
the bidder knows his value and the seller must give him a rent to induce him to 
reveal his private information.  
Finally, note that the marginal revenue approach is similar to monopoly pricing, 
because the bidder with a negative marginal revenue does not obtain the object. 
This is similar to a monopolist who never sells a quantity such that his marginal 
revenue  is  negative.  There  is  one  more  analogy  with  monopoly  pricing.  A 
monopoly maximizes profit when marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. In 
the  auction  context,  marginal  cost  can  be  interpreted  as  a  seller's  value v0. 
Equating marginal revenue with marginal cost we obtain the optimal reserve 
price  derived  in  the  preceding  part.  If  the  seller  wishes  to  increase  the 
probability of selling the object (quantity) he has to decrease the reserve price. 
The same applies to a monopoly that has to decrease the price to sell more.  
7. RELAXING THE REVENUE EQUIVALENCE ASSUMPTIONS 
We have noted that the revenue equivalence holds only with private values and 
with risk neutral and symmetric bidders. If one of these assumptions is relaxed, 
revenue equivalence does not hold. In the following discussion we will study the 
impact of removing one of the three assumptions while retaining the others.  
Risk averse bidders 
We will suppose that bidders have the same utility function  ) (⋅ u  and that they 
are risk averse  0 ) ( ' ' ≤ ⋅ u . First, note that the equilibrium behaviour in a second-
price  auction  is  unaffected  by  risk  aversion,  because  it  is  still  a  dominant 
strategy to bid one's value. Therefore, the expected revenue of the seller is the 
same regardless of whether bidders are risk averse or risk neutral.  
However, the equilibrium behaviour in a first-price auction is affected by risk 
aversion. It can be proved that the more risk averse bidder bids higher than a 
less risk averse bidder (see appendix B). This result holds if bidder 1 is risk 
averse and bidder 2 is risk neutral. In that case, risk averse bidder 1 will bid 
higher than risk neutral bidder 2.  
We have mentioned that a bidder faces the trade off in a first-price auction. If he 
bids lower, he will pay less if he wins, but at the same time he reduces the 
probability of winning. When a bidder is risk averse, the increase in expected 
utility from paying less is lower than the decrease in expected utility if he loses. 
This explains why a risk averse bidder bids higher than a risk neutral bidder. In 
other words, the difference in the bid of a risk averse and a risk neutral bidder can 
be considered as an insurance premium against the possible loss. 
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when  bidders  are  risk  averse  than  when  they  are  risk  neutral.  The  expected 
revenue in a second-price auction is the same regardless of risk aversion, and 
since revenue equivalence holds for risk neutral bidders expected revenues are 
the same in the two auction forms. On the other hand, when bidders are risk 
averse a first-price auction gives strictly higher expected revenue to the seller than 
a second-price auction. 
In  a  very  technical  paper,  Maskin  and  Riley  (1984)  study  optimal  auction 
mechanisms for a risk neutral seller who faces risk averse bidders. They prove 
that it is optimal for a seller to offer insurance against a loss to bidders with high 
values to induce them to bid higher than they would bid without the insurance.  
Asymmetric bidders 
When bidders are asymmetric, they have different probability distributions for 
their values or have the same probability distribution but with different support. 
For example, it might be the case that the distribution function of the second 
bidder dominates the distribution function of the first bidder according to first 
order stochastic dominance,  ) ( ) ( 1 2 v F v F ≤ . The other possibility is that the two 
distribution functions are the same, but that the first distribution function has a 
support  ] , 0 [ 1 ω  and the second  ] , 0 [ 2 ω , where  ω ω 1 2 > . Finally, it is possible that 
one distribution dominates the other and has a wider support. Whatever the 
case, we will call bidder 1 weak bidder and bidder 2 strong bidder.  
Vickrey  (1961)  studied  first-price  auctions  with  asymmetric  bidders  and  he 
reached the conclusion that it is impossible to derive closed form expressions 
for equilibrium bidding strategies in the general case and he concentrated his 
attention to one particular case where bidder 1 has fixed value and bidder 2 has 
a value drawn from some support.  
One tractable case where equilibrium bidding strategies in first-price auctions 
could be derived after solving a system of differential equations is the case of 
uniform distribution, where the value of the weak bidder belongs to  ] , 0 [ 1 ω  and 
the value of the strong bidder belongs to  ] , 0 [ 2 ω , where  ω ω 1 2 > . As we will see 
below,  Maskin  and  Riley  (2000)  call  this  type  of  asymmetry  a  distribution 
stretch. In this case it can be shown that a weak bidder bids more aggressively 
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bidder dominates the distribution function of the first bidder according to first 
order stochastic dominance,  ) ( ) ( 1 2 v F v F ≤ . The other possibility is that the two 
distribution functions are the same, but that the first distribution function has a 
support  ] , 0 [ 1 ω  and the second  ] , 0 [ 2 ω , where  ω ω 1 2 > . Finally, it is possible that 
one distribution dominates the other and has a wider support. Whatever the 
case, we will call bidder 1 weak bidder and bidder 2 strong bidder.  
Vickrey  (1961)  studied  first-price  auctions  with  asymmetric  bidders  and  he 
reached the conclusion that it is impossible to derive closed form expressions 
for equilibrium bidding strategies in the general case and he concentrated his 
attention to one particular case where bidder 1 has fixed value and bidder 2 has 
a value drawn from some support.  
One tractable case where equilibrium bidding strategies in first-price auctions 
could be derived after solving a system of differential equations is the case of 
uniform distribution, where the value of the weak bidder belongs to  ] , 0 [ 1 ω  and 
the value of the strong bidder belongs to  ] , 0 [ 2 ω , where  ω ω 1 2 > . As we will see 
below,  Maskin  and  Riley  (2000)  call  this  type  of  asymmetry  a  distribution 
stretch. In this case it can be shown that a weak bidder bids more aggressively 
than a strong bidder. This means that if two bidders have the same value the 
weak bidder will submit a higher bid. But this result shows that with positive 
probability the allocation in a first-price auction with asymmetric bidders could 
be inefficient.  
On the other hand, a second-price auction is again robust to relaxing one of the 
assumptions. Regardless whether bidders are symmetric or not, the dominant 
strategy for each bidder is to bid his value. Thus, while a second-price auction 
allocates  efficiently,  a  first-price  auction  allocates  inefficiently  with  positive 
probability. Since the general revenue equivalence principle implies that the two 
auction forms that have the same allocation rule give the same expected revenue 
to  the  seller,  it  follows  that  with  asymmetric  bidders  first  and  second-price 
auctions will lead to different expected revenues for the seller. Thus, a first-price 
auction favours the weak bidder who can win the auction even though he has a 
lower  value.  A  second-price  auction  favours  the  strong  bidder  because  it 
allocates efficiently.  
Maskin  and  Riley  (2000)  study  different  types  of  asymmetries  and  find  that 
different asymmetries lead to different rankings of auction forms in terms of a 
seller’s  expected  revenue.  The  first  case  they  study  is  when  one  bidder’s 
distribution  is  shifted  to  the  right.  For  example,  bidder  1’s  value  belongs  to 
interval  ] 1 , 0 [  and bidder 2’s value belongs to interval  ] 2 , 1 [  and the values are 
uniformly  distributed.  Each  bidder  knows  the  support  of  the  distribution 
function of the other bidder. In a first-price auction bidder 2 would therefore 
always bid 1 because this guarantees that he would win the auction for sure. On 
the other hand, in a second-price auction, he would pay the second highest 
value. In other words, he would pay the expected value of the other bidder, 
which is equal to 1/2. Thus, when the distribution of the strong bidder is shifted to 
the right, a first-price auction will generate higher expected revenue for the seller 
than a second-price auction.  
The  other  form  of  asymmetry  studied  by  Maskin  and  Riley  (2000)  is  a 
distribution stretch, which means that a strong bidder’s value is stretched over a 
wider interval. For example, a weak bidder’s value is uniformly distributed over 
the interval  ] 1 , 0 [  and a strong bidder’s value is uniformly distributed over the 
interval  ] 2 , 0 [ . Maskin and Riley (2000) prove that when a strong bidder in such 
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97a  case  is  faced  with  a  weak  bidder  in  a  first-price  auction,  he  will  bid  less 
aggressively than he would bid if he were to face another strong bidder. On the 
other hand, a weak bidder would bid more aggressively in a first-price auction 
than he would bid if he were to face another weak bidder. The net effect is such 
that  the  seller’s  expected  revenue  is  higher  in  a  first-price  auction  than  in  a 
second-price auction.  
The third type of asymmetry studied by Maskin and Riley (2000) is a shift of 
probability  mass  to  the  lower  end  point  of  the  distribution.  For  example, 
suppose that two bidders have degenerate distributions over the interval  ] 2 , 0 [  in 
which all probability is concentrated in 2. If we shift half of the mass to the point 
0 for bidder 1, he becomes the weak bidder who has a value 0 or 2 with equal 
probability. The second bidder becomes the strong bidder who always has a 
value of 2. In a second-price auction the seller’s revenue is positive only if the 
weak  bidder  has  a  value  of  2.  Therefore,  the  seller’s  expected  revenue  in  a 
second-price auction is equal to  1 ] 2 Pr[ 2 2 = = ⋅ v , where 2 is the price paid by 
the winning bidder and  ] 2 Pr[ 2 = v  is the probability that the second bidder has a 
value of 2. In a first-price auction, the strong bidder would bid slightly above 
zero and he would win with probability 1/2 whenever the weak bidder has a 
value of 0. His expected payoff from this bid is  1 ) 0 2 ( 5 , 0 = − ⋅ . The strong bidder 
would  never  bid  more  than  1  in  equilibrium  since  he  can  only  reduce  his 
expected payoff. The weak bidder would win for sure with a bid  ε + 1 , for small 
ε  and  his  ex  ante  expected  payoff  would  be  5 , 0 )) 1 ( 2 ( 5 , 0 ≈ + − ⋅ ε .  The  total 
expected payoff of the two bidders is 1,5. The bidder who has a value of 2 always 
wins and the social surplus is equal to 2. The seller’s expected revenue is the 
difference  between  the  social  surplus  and  the  sum  of  the  bidder's  expected 
payoffs and is equal to 1/2. Thus for a shift of probability mass a second-price 
auction out-performs a first-price auction in terms of the seller’s expected revenue.  
Interdependent values 
When values are interdependent, the value of one bidder depends on the values 
of other bidders. In particular, it is assumed that each bidder receives a noisy 
signal  Si that represents his private estimate of the value of the object. A value 
that a bidder assigns to the object depends on his signal and on the signals of 
other  bidders.  If  there  are  N  bidders,  bidder  i  assigns  a  value 
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i i =  to the object, where vi  is his valuation function that is non-
decreasing in all N arguments. When values are interdependent, the revenue 
equivalence fails.  
Milgrom and Weber (1982) studied auctions with interdependent values. They 
introduced  the  concept  of  affiliation,  which  is  a  stronger  concept  than 
correlation. Roughly speaking, affiliation means that if one bidder's signal is 
high it is more likely that others' signals are high rather than low.  
In  the  case  of  interdependent  values,  an  English  auction  is  no  longer 
strategically  equivalent  to  a  second-price  auction,  for  the  following  reason. 
When one bidder drops out from an English auction, the other bidders can infer 
his signal and update their estimates of the value of the object. In a second-price 
sealed-bid  auction  such  signal  extraction  is  not  possible.  Since  signals  are 
affiliated, bidders will assign higher value to the object in an English auction 
than in a second-price auction, and Milgrom and Weber (1982) prove that an 
English auction yields higher expected revenue for the seller than a second-price 
auction. They are equivalent only when there are two bidders, because when one 
bidder drops out, the auction is over and the other bidder cannot benefit from 
inferring the signal of the losing bidder. Milgrom and Weber (1982) also show 
that a second-price auction yields higher expected revenue than a first-price 
auction. Thus, the English auction out-performs a second-price auction and a 
second-price auction out-performs a first-price auction. This result is known as 
the revenue ranking or linkage principle.  
This argument was used by Milgrom (1989) to explain the popularity of the 
English auction. If values are private it yields the same expected revenue to the 
seller as other auction forms, but when values are interdependent it is revenue 
superior.  Furthermore,  it  leads  to  efficient  outcomes  even  with  asymmetric 
bidders  and  bidders  face  a  simpler  decision  problem  than  in  first-price  and 
Dutch  auctions,  as  we  have  mentioned.  Its  main  disadvantages  are  that  it 
requires the actual presence of bidders at auction, and, as we will soon see, it is 
fragile to collusive behaviour.  
It is important to note that even with affiliated values Dutch and first-price 
auctions  remain  strategically  equivalent,  because  the  Dutch  auction  is  over 
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99when  one  bidder  accepts  the  price  and  other  bidders  cannot  benefit  from 
inferring his signal. The same holds for a first-price sealed-bid auction, where a 
bidder  cannot  obtain  any  information  about  the  other  bidders'  signals. 
Therefore, we can say that English and second-price auctions are equivalent in 
the weak sense, i.e. they are equivalent only when values are private or there are 
only  two  bidders.  On  the  other  hand,  Dutch  and  first-price  auctions  are 
equivalent  in  the  strong  sense,  i.e.  they  are  equivalent  with  both  private  and 
interdependent values.  
8. BIDDING RINGS 
Up  to  this  point  we  have  assumed  that  bidders  act  non-cooperatively.  But 
bidders can coordinate their activities and make a cartel or a ring in order to 
increase their profit. In this case there is only one bidder who bids in the name 
of the ring, while the other bidders do not submit bids. Members of the ring 
share the profit of the cooperative behaviour. Some auction mechanisms are 
more  susceptible  to  collusive  behaviour.  We  will  show  that  a  second-price 
auction is vulnerable to collusive behaviour, and that a cartel is not stable in a 
first-price  auction.  The  study  of  collusive  behaviour  is  important,  because 
cartels are present in many auctions, and in most cases the victim of collusion is 
a government agency, as reported by Hendricks and Porter (1989).  
Collusion in second-price auctions 
Graham  and  Marshall  (1987)  analyse  cartels  at  second-price  auctions.  They 
describe cartels in the following way. There is a sole bidder who bids in the 
name of the ring and the profit from the cooperative behaviour is shared among 
the ring members. Rings have open membership policies, meaning that non-
members  are  invited  to  join.  A  ring  tries  to  hide  its  existence  from  the 
auctioneer and the only instrument the auctioneer has when facing a ring is to 
post a reserve price. 
Suppose that there are N bidders at the auction, and that K bidders form a ring 
whereas other N-K bidders act non-cooperatively. In a second-price auction the 
price a bidder pays is equal to the second highest value. As we have mentioned, 
there is only one bidder who bids in the name of the ring and the ring uses a 
mechanism, which will be explained later, to choose a bidder with the highest 
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a government agency, as reported by Hendricks and Porter (1989).  
Collusion in second-price auctions 
Graham  and  Marshall  (1987)  analyse  cartels  at  second-price  auctions.  They 
describe cartels in the following way. There is a sole bidder who bids in the 
name of the ring and the profit from the cooperative behaviour is shared among 
the ring members. Rings have open membership policies, meaning that non-
members  are  invited  to  join.  A  ring  tries  to  hide  its  existence  from  the 
auctioneer and the only instrument the auctioneer has when facing a ring is to 
post a reserve price. 
Suppose that there are N bidders at the auction, and that K bidders form a ring 
whereas other N-K bidders act non-cooperatively. In a second-price auction the 
price a bidder pays is equal to the second highest value. As we have mentioned, 
there is only one bidder who bids in the name of the ring and the ring uses a 
mechanism, which will be explained later, to choose a bidder with the highest 
value who will represent the ring. The profit of the ring stems from the fact that 
the second highest value belongs to a member of the ring who will not submit a bid 
and the winner pays a lower price than he would pay if the ring did not exist.  
The ring centre coordinates the activities of the ring and acts as a banker. The 
ring centre makes a fixed payment P to each member of the ring. Each member 
of the ring submits a sealed bid to the ring centre, who determines the highest 
and second highest value, and the bidder with the highest bid will represent the 
ring at the main auction. This auction, which selects the ring's nominee for the 
main  auction,  is  called  a  second-price  pre-auction  knockout  (PAKT).  If  the 
ring's  representative  wins  the  item  at  the  main  auction,  he  pays  the  second 
highest value of all submitted bids to the auctioneer and pays to the ring centre 
the difference between the second highest value determined in PAKT and the 
second  highest  value  at  the  main  auction,  if  this  difference  is  positive.  This 
amount  is  a  ring's  profit  and  we  will  denote  it  by δ .  This  value  cannot  be 
negative because the winner is not obliged to pay to the centre if the second 
highest value determined in the PAKT is lower than the second highest value at 
the main auction. The ring centre has to make fixed payments prior to the main 
auction and obtains transfers only when the ring's representative wins the item 
and obtains a profit, when  0 > δ . If there are K members of the ring, the ring 
centre has to pay KP to the members of the ring, and the ring's expected profit is 
) (δ E . In order to balance the budget in expected terms, the ring centre will pay 
K E P / ) (δ =  to each ring member. If the ring does not obtain the item, the ring 
centre will have to pay KP and receives nothing. On the other hand, if δ  is very 
large, the ring centre runs a surplus since its revenues exceed its payments. Thus, 
the ring centre balances the budget in expected terms, but in some cases runs a 
deficit. In other words, the budget of the ring centre is not balanced ex post. This 
is the main weakness of a PAKT, since it needs an outside banker to finance its 
workings.  
We will now show that the PAKT is an incentive compatible and individually 
rational mechanism. Incentive compatibility means that each member of the 
ring  will  report  truthfully  his  value  to  the  centre,  and  individual  rationality 
means that each member of the ring has an incentive to become a member of 
the ring.  
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101If the winning bidder is a member of the ring, he pays the second highest value 
at the main auction and pays the difference between the ring's second highest 
value  and  the  second  highest  value  at  the  main  auction  to  the  ring  centre, 
provided this difference is positive. In fact the winner pays the second highest of 
all N values as in an ordinary second-price auction and he reports truthfully his 
value to the ring centre. 
If the ring does not obtain the item, each member benefits since he receives P 
and if he had acted individually he would have obtained nothing. The same 
argument applies if the ring obtains the item, but it is awarded to the other 
member  of  the  ring.  The  membership  is  again  beneficial,  since  the  member 
receives P and he would receive nothing by acting individually. Finally, if the 
ring  obtains  the  item  the  bidder  who  is  awarded  the  item  benefits  from 
membership since he gets the object and pays the same price he would pay if he 
acted  individually,  but  receives  an  additional  amount  P.  Thus,  PAKT  is  an 
individually rational mechanism. 
The cartel does not exert externalities to bidders who are not members of the 
ring. A non-member will win the item with the same probability as in the case 
without the cartel. The price he would pay upon winning is the same as without 
the ring and his expected payment and expected profit are the same. Therefore, 
the profit of the cartel is equal to the loss of the seller. Finally, the cartel's profit 
rises with the size of the ring. If we add one more bidder to the ring, the price 
paid at the main auction by the ring could be lower if that bidder is the one who 
has the second highest value at the main auction. The cartel is self-enforcing and 
in Nash equilibrium all bidders are members of the cartel (K=N). Without a 
reserve price, this cartel could obtain the item for a price of zero and the seller 
acts strategically and posts a reserve price.  
Graham  and  Marshall  (1987)  show  that  the  optimal  reserve  price  increases 
according  to  the  size  of  the  ring  (for  a  formal  proof  of  this  statement  see 
appendix C). Thus, the seller faces the following trade off. As the size of the ring 
increases for a given reserve price, the expected revenue of the seller falls, since 
we have seen that the expected profit of the ring increases with its size and the 
profit of the ring equals the expected loss of the seller. The seller offsets this 
effect  by  raising  the  reserve  price,  but  at  the  same  time,  he  increases  the 
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in Nash equilibrium all bidders are members of the cartel (K=N). Without a 
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Graham  and  Marshall  (1987)  show  that  the  optimal  reserve  price  increases 
according  to  the  size  of  the  ring  (for  a  formal  proof  of  this  statement  see 
appendix C). Thus, the seller faces the following trade off. As the size of the ring 
increases for a given reserve price, the expected revenue of the seller falls, since 
we have seen that the expected profit of the ring increases with its size and the 
profit of the ring equals the expected loss of the seller. The seller offsets this 
effect  by  raising  the  reserve  price,  but  at  the  same  time,  he  increases  the 
probability of retaining the item. Finally, in Nash equilibrium the cartel will be 
all-inclusive (K=N) and the seller will post a reserve price for that size of the ring. 
In other words, the cartel will offer a ''take it or leave it'' reserve price to a single 
bidder in Nash equilibrium.  
Collusion in first-price auctions  
McAfee and McMillan (1992) analyse all-inclusive cartels at first-price auctions 
(K=N). The reason for studying an all-inclusive cartel is that even if bidders are 
ex  ante  symmetric,  there  exists  an  ex  post  asymmetry  in  bidding  strategies 
between  members  and  non-members  of  the  cartel.  This  problem  does  not 
appear  in  second-price  auctions.  They  identify  four  types  of  cartel:  (i)  tacit 
mechanism  in  which  there  are  no  transfers  between  members  and  each 
member's bid depends only on his value; (ii) coordinative mechanism in which 
there are no transfers but a bid submitted by a particular member depends on 
his value and the values of other members; (iii) transfer mechanism in which 
there are transfers and the budget is balanced ex post, i.e. the budget of the ring 
centre is balanced for every possible realization of values; (iv) budget-breaking 
mechanism in which the budget is balanced only in expected terms. In further 
analysis  they  group  the  four  types  into  only  two  types,  which  differ  by  the 
presence or absence of transfers. Cartels that do not make transfer payments are 
called weak cartels and cartels that make side payments are called strong cartels. 
Weak cartels do not make transfers because of the fear of prosecution by the 
antitrust authorities. This argument can be supported by the data, because most 
of the bid-rigging convictions in the US began when one member of the cartel 
was unhappy with the division of cartel profits and started working against his 
fellows. McAfee and McMillan (1992) show that for a weak cartel it is optimal to 
every member who has a higher value than the reserve price to bid the reserve 
price.  Since  all  bidders  submit  the  same  bid,  the  seller  allocates  the  object 
randomly and the allocation will be inefficient because there is no guarantee 
that the bidder with the highest value will win the item. Weak cartels sometimes 
use rotating bids. In that case there is a mechanism that designs the order in 
which members bid. The first bidder on the list is asked whether he is willing to 
pay the reserve price. If he refuses, the next bidder is asked, and so on. Weak 
cartels use rotating bids for two reasons. First, identical bids result in the equal 
probability  of  obtaining  the  object  for  every  cartel  member,  and  sometimes 
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the agreement by refusing to randomize. If he receives identical bids, he can 
employ a rule that will allocate the object to the smallest firm or the largest firm. 
The absence of randomization can destroy the cartel agreement, and a weak 
cartel could prefer rotating bids. 
A strong cartel makes side payments between its members. The strong cartel 
needs a mechanism to elect a cartel representative. As in a second-price auction, 
a first-price PAKT can be used. In the pre-auction phase, each bidder submits a 
bid b
PAKT  that  represents  the  offer  to  pay  all  the  members  that  amount.  To 
simplify the discussion, suppose that the reserve price is equal to zero and that 
values  are  uniformly  distributed  over  ] 1 , 0 [ .  We  have  derived  an  equilibrium 
bidding strategy for this case in a first-price auction  v N N v b ⋅ − = ] / ) 1 [( ) ( .  
We argue that in a first-price PAKT symmetric equilibrium strategies are: 
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If a bidder acts individually he would obtain a profit of  ) (v b v − , and because of 
the presence of the cartel, the cartel representative will earn an additional profit 
of  ) (v b , because he will bid 0 and pay that price, since the cartel is all-inclusive. 
Thus,  the  cartel's  profit  is  equal  to  ) (v b  and  is  divided  equally  among  its 
members.  The  bidder  with  the  highest b
PAKT  will  represent  the  cartel  at  the 
auction.  
We will prove that a first-price PAKT is an individually rational mechanism. If 
bidders act non-cooperatively, the winning bidder receives a profit: 
N
v
v
N
N NC = ⋅ ⎥ ⎦
⎤
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− =
1
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If that bidder is the cartel's representative he will win the auction for sure, and 
his profit after paying b
PAKT  to his N-1 fellows is: 
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The absence of randomization can destroy the cartel agreement, and a weak 
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Thus, the cooperative profit of the winning bidder is strictly larger than his non-
cooperative profit if: 
N N
N 1 1 2
2 >
− ,  (56) 
which always holds for  1 > N . The bidders who would lose the auction would 
receive nothing without the agreement, and receive b
PAKT  if they participate in 
the ring. Thus, any bidder cannot do any better than to participate, and a first-
price PAKT is an individually rational mechanism. It can be shown that in a 
first-price PAKT each bidder will bid b
PAKT  according to his true value, which 
means that a bidder with the highest value will win the PAKT, but the proof is 
more  involved.  Finally,  a  first-price  PAKT  is  not  an  incentive  compatible 
mechanism, since bidders do not reveal their true values.  
The seller can respond in four ways to the cartel agreement. First, he can post a 
reserve price, and that reserve price will be higher than the reserve price in a 
non-cooperative auction. A bidder’s profit could be higher in a non-cooperative 
auction with a lower reserve price than in a cooperative auction with higher 
reserve price and this could deter collusion. Second, he can keep the reserve 
price secret. If bidders do not know the reserve price, they must communicate to 
determine the bid. But communication increases the risk that a cartel will be 
prosecuted  by  the  antitrust  authorities.  Third,  the  seller  can  influence  the 
mechanism for determining the cartel's representative, which would make the 
cartel more fragile. This will be further discussed in the following paragraph. 
Hendriks and Porter (1989) mentioned another strategy that a seller could use. 
He  could  announce  the  identity  of  the  winning  bidder  and  not  his  bid  and 
losing bids. This could possibly prevent a weak cartel from submitting identical 
bids.  
Stability of the cartel agreement 
Robinson (1985) makes a simple but important contribution to the theory of 
collusive behaviour. He argues that a cartel agreement is less stable in a first-
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employ the preceding example with uniform distribution. In this example the 
cartel representative bids 0 and all other bidders do not submit bids in a first-
price auction. If all bidders behave in this way a particular bidder who is not 
elected as the cartel’s representative has an incentive to cheat and bid slightly 
higher than zero and he obtains a higher profit than in cooperation, provided 
that other cartel members respect the agreement. On the other hand, the cartel 
in a second-price auction is stable, since each member who has not won the 
PAKT has no incentive to cheat because he cannot win the main auction at the 
price that is profitable since there will be at least one bidder with higher value 
(the cartel's representative) at the main auction. Thus, a cartel in a first-price 
auction is less stable than in a second-price auction. Therefore, from the point of 
view of the seller who faces a threat of collusive behaviour, a first-price auction 
might be preferable. The cartel in a first-price auction can be stable if the game 
is repeated infinitely many times, so cheating will be deterred by the threat of 
expulsion from future auctions.  
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The  approach  in  this  paper  was  mainly  theoretic,  although  auctions  are 
important from the practical point of view as well. Klemperer (2004) describes 
the use of the hybrid Anglo-Dutch auction which was used to sell 3G mobile-
phone licenses in UK in 2000. The government intended to sell 4 licenses. In the 
first part of the auction an English auction was used until 5 bidders remained. In 
the second stage the 5 remaining bidders submitted sealed bids and bidders with 
the four highest bids obtained the licenses. The main concerns in choosing this 
auction design were to attract entry and to deter collusion.  
The above story tells us how theoretical achievements can be used in practice. 
But at the same time a practical auction designer should be cautious, because 
theoretical results are based on some restrictive assumptions and an auction 
designer in practice has to identify the most important problems in a particular 
auction. As we know from game theory, games with incomplete information are 
particularly fragile to changing the assumptions.  
In this paper we have analysed single object auctions with private values and 
this is the simplest class of auction mechanism. Auctions with interdependent 
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The  approach  in  this  paper  was  mainly  theoretic,  although  auctions  are 
important from the practical point of view as well. Klemperer (2004) describes 
the use of the hybrid Anglo-Dutch auction which was used to sell 3G mobile-
phone licenses in UK in 2000. The government intended to sell 4 licenses. In the 
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But at the same time a practical auction designer should be cautious, because 
theoretical results are based on some restrictive assumptions and an auction 
designer in practice has to identify the most important problems in a particular 
auction. As we know from game theory, games with incomplete information are 
particularly fragile to changing the assumptions.  
In this paper we have analysed single object auctions with private values and 
this is the simplest class of auction mechanism. Auctions with interdependent 
values, and especially multiple-object auctions, are more challenging from the 
modelling point of view and these topics remain for further research.  
APPENDIX 
A. Proof of the revenue equivalence by using the game-theoretic approach
4 
Recall that the seller's expected revenue in a first-price auction is: 
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to find the derivative of the integral. Thus, the derivative of (A3) is: 
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4  The proof relies on Menezes and Monteiro (2004). 
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Substituting this result in (A2) we obtain that:  
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We know that equilibrium bidding strategy in a first-price auction is: 
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From (A10) it follows that: 
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By substituting this result in (A7) we have that: 
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where we have derived expected revenue in a second-price auction,  R
2, in (16) 
in the text. ■ 
B.  Proof that equilibrium bidding strategy is increasing  
in bidder's risk aversion in a first-price auction 
5 
A risk neutral bidder maximizes expected profit, whereas a risk averse bidder 
maximizes expected utility. Bidder 1's expected utility is: 
)) ( ( ) ( 1
1 v b v u v F
N − ⋅ = Π
− .  (B1) 
In  equilibrium  a  bidder  bids  according  to  his  true  value.  The  first  order 
condition gives: 
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Rearranging terms, we obtain the following differential equation:  
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We will use the boundary condition that  0 ) 0 ( = b  and suppose that bidder 2 has 
a higher coefficient of absolute risk aversion: 
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We have to prove that the more risk averse bidder 2 bids higher than the less 
risk averse bidder 1,  ) ( ) ( 1 2 v b v b > . 
From (B3) it follows that if: 
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5  This proof closely follows Riley and Samuelson (1981).  
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condition  0 ) 0 ( = b . Since  ) (⋅ u  is strictly increasing and  0 ) 0 ( = u , we have that for 
all  0 > v : 
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From  (B5)  we  see  that  for  all v such  that  0 ) ( = v φ  or 
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Thus, using the boundary condition that  0 ) ( = v φ  and the fact that  0 ) ( ' > v φ , it 
follows that  0 ) ( > v φ . Since  0 ) ( > v φ , we have proved that  ) ( ) ( 1 2 v b v b > . ■ 
C. Proof that the equilibrium reserve price increases according to the size of the ring
6 
Suppose that the ring consists of K bidders. Denote by Y
K
1  the highest value in 
the ring and denote by Z
K
2  the second highest bid at the main auction. If the 
seller posts a reserve price r, the price paid at the main auction will be  Z
K
2  if 
r Z
K > 2 , otherwise the price will be r. Denote by  ) (⋅ F
K  the distribution function 
of  Z
K
2  and  by  ) (⋅ f
K  the  corresponding  density.  As  usual,  ) (⋅ G  is  the 
distribution function of the highest value and  ) (⋅ g  is the corresponding density. 
The expected selling price for the seller is: 
dz z f z r G r F r
K
r
K ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ∫ + − ⋅
ω .  (C1) 
The first term represents the event that the item is sold at the reserve price. This 
occurs when the highest value is higher than the reserve price and the second 
highest is lower than the reserve price. The integral represents the event that the 
first and  second highest  values  are higher than  r  when the winner pays the 
second highest value Z
K
2 .  
                                                 
6  The proof is based on Krishna (2002).  
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The seller maximizes his revenue when the derivative of (C1) is equal to zero: 
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( = ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ + − r f r r g r r f r r G r F
K K K ,  (C2) 
0 *) ( * *) ( *) ( = ⋅ − − r g r r G r F
K ,  (C3) 
where we have used Leibnitz's rule to find the derivative of the integral. The 
optimal reserve price  * r  solves the last equation. 
Now, suppose that an additional bidder joins the cartel and that the cartel has 
1 + K  members. Denote by  Z
K 1
2
+  the second highest value at the main auction in 
this  case  and  denote  by  ) ( 1 ⋅ + F
K  the  distribution  function  of  Z
K 1
2
+  and  by 
) (
1 ⋅
+ f
K  the corresponding density. Z
K 1
2
+  differs from Z
K
2  in only two cases. If 
the bidder K+1 who joins the cartel had the second highest value at the main 
auction,  the  second  highest  value  will  be  smaller  once  he  joins  the  cartel 
Z Z
K K
2
1
2 < + . In the second case, if bidder K+1 won the main auction and cartel 
had the second-highest value, the new second highest value will be again smaller 
than the old one  Z Z
K K
2
1
2 < + . In all  other cases the second highest value will 
remain unchanged  Z Z
K K
2
1
2 = + . We have shown that with positive probability the 
second  highest  value  at  the  main  auction  will  be  lower  when  an  additional 
bidder  joins  the  cartel  ( Z Z
K K
2
1
2 ≤ + )  and  this  implies  that  ) (⋅ F
K  dominates 
) ( 1 ⋅ + F
K  by first order stochastic dominance. First order stochastic dominance 
implies  that  if  a  seller  prefers  ) (⋅ F
K  to  ) ( 1 ⋅ + F
K ,  then  ) ( ) ( 1 ⋅ ≤ ⋅ + F F
K K .  The 
expected selling price for the seller when the cartel is of size K+1 is: 
dz z f z r G r F r
K
r
K ) ( )) ( ) ( (
1 1 + + ∫ + − ⋅
ω .  (C4) 
The derivative of (C4) at the level of the previously optimal reserve price is  * r  is 
positive because  ) ( ) ( 1 ⋅ ≤ ⋅ + F F
K K : 
0 *) ( * *) ( *) ( 1 ≥ ⋅ − − + r g r r G r F
K .  (C5) 
The last inequality implies that the optimal reserve price for a ring of size K+1, 
* * r , must be higher than the previously optimal reserve price  * r . ■ 
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